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NON-DISCRIMLNATORY INCOME
TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENT
TAXPAYERS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: A PROPOSAL
Kees van Raad*
PREFACE
This contribution to the debate focuses on a subject that
Michael Graetz has expressly left open: The application of the
concepts of fairness and reciprocity to the taxation of non-resi-
dents in light of the increasing mobility of individuals. This
mobility has become particularly important with respect to
smaller countries that are in geographic proximity of one an-
other such as the Member States of the European Union (EU).
Discriminatory tax treatment by both source countries and
residence countries in dealing with cross-border income of
individuals is widespread and clearly has a restrictive effect on
such mobility.
After an introductory paragraph, an overview is given on
the various levels at which discriminatory tax treatment oc-
curs, followed by a proposal to overcome such differential treat-
ment in a world-and certainly in an economic and monetary
union such as the European Union-where disparities among
tax systems are large.'
* The author is Professor of International Tax Law at the University of
Leiden (the Netherlands) and Chairman of the International Tax Center, Leiden.
Professor van Raad is the author of numerous books and articles on international
tax law, including, with Professor Richard L. Doernberg, THE 1996 UNITED STATES
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: ANALYSIS, COMMENTARY AND COMPARISON
(KIuwer Law International 1997). He currently serves as the chairman of the re-
search subcommittee of the International Fiscal Association overseeing preparatory
research for IFA congress subjects and seminar topics, and chair for the Academic
Committee of the Association of European Tax Law Professors. He is a graduate
of the University of Leiden and Georgetown University.
1. This proposal is based on a contribution the author wrote in 1997 for the
Liber Amicorum for Jean-Pierre Lagae (CED, SAMSON, Diegem [Belgium] 1998)
under the title "Niet-discriminerende belastingheffing van beperkt
belastingplichtigen door EU-lidstaten" (Non-discriminatory taxation of non-resident
taxpayers by EU Member States).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1995 decision in Wielockx2 the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (EC Court or Court) observed that,
"[A]lthough direct taxation falls within the competence of the
Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that
competence consistently with Community law and therefore
avoid any overt or covert discrimination by reason of nationali-
ty.S
3
In other words, while the income tax law among the EU
Member States hardly has been harmonized, it must meet the
requirements regarding non-discrimination laid down in the
EC Treaty rules on the fundamental freedom of movement.
These rules went largely unnoticed by the Member States'
legislators and executives until 1986. In May 1986, the EC
Court issued its first decision on the compatibility of a domes-
tic income tax rule of an EU Member State with the funda-
mental freedom bf movement provisions of the EC Treaty.
Since that time, the Court has rendered over 20 decisions on
that issue. About half of these decisions deal with the question
of whether the tax treatment of non-resident taxpayers, as
compared to resident taxpayers, meets the non-discrimination
standards of the freedom of movement provisions of the EC
Treaty.
The EC Treaty contains the following fundamental free-
dom provisions that are relevant in income taxation:
Article 39: Freedom of cross-border movement of employees.
Article 43: Freedom of cross-border establishment of busi-
nesses.
Article 49: Freedom of cross-border rendering of services.
Articles 56-58: Freedom of cross-border movement of capital
and payments.
In the first two provisions the freedom of movement is
defined expressly as including a prohibition to discriminate on
the basis of nationality. With regard to the two latter types of
provisions the EC Court has ruled that, since nationality-based
2. Case C-80194, G.H.E.J. Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen,
1995 E.C.R. 1-2508.
3. Id.
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discrimination effectively restricts cross-border movement,
these provisions equally forbid such discrimination.
It should be noted that, while "nationality" generally is not
used by EU Member States as a relevant criterion in the taxa-
tion of individuals, the EC Court has interpreted the Treaty's
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality as
forbidding not only overt discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality, but also covert forms of such discrimination. In its
Schumacker decision, 4 the Court ruled that differential treat-
ment of non-resident taxpayers as compared to resident tax-
payers may amount to a covert form of nationality discrimina-
tion:
[IN ational rules..., under which a distinction is drawn
on the basis of residence in that non-residents are denied cer-
tain benefits which are, conversely, granted to persons resid-
ing within national territory, are liable to operate mainly to
the detriment of nationals of other Member States. Non-resi-
dents are in the majority of cases foreigners.5
The pattern that arises from the various decisions by the
EC Court on the tax treatment by source states of non-resident
taxpayers is not entirely coherent. In the following paragraphs
these decisions briefly will be analyzed and a proposal will be
discussed for cohesive non-discriminatory income taxation of
non-resident taxpayers.
II. THE ELEMENTS IN THE COMPUTATION OF INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAx LIABILITY
In most countries an individual's income tax liability is
computed by taking into account the following elements:
(a) Items of gross income reduced by pertinent expenses;
(b) Personal deductions, i.e., deductions that are related not to
items of income but to the personal circumstances of the tax-
payer himself and his family (e.g., medical expenses, alimony
payments, charitable contributions); and,
(c) Tax rate.
4. Case C-279193, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995
E.C.R. 1-249.
5. Id. at 1-259.
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The total amount of the gross income items minus perti-
nent expenses (a) is reduced by the total amount of the person-
al deductions (b). To the resulting amount the tax rate (c) is
applied. In the paragraphs that follow each of these elements
briefly is discussed.
III. GROSS INCOME ITEMS AND DEDUCTIBLE (BUSINESS)
EXPENSES
The EC Court has not yet decided any case that directly
deals with the issues: (1) whether a source country may tax a
non-resident taxpayer on items of income in respect of which
residents of that country are not taxed (e.g., non-business capi-
tal gains, in respect of which in a given country resident indi-
viduals are not subject to tax, are taxed to non-resident indi-
viduals that derive such a gain); and, (2) whether a source
country may deny to a non-resident taxpayer a (business) de-
duction in respect of a given item of income to which a resident
taxpayer is entitled (e.g., while resident employees are entitled
to a deduction for commuting expenses, frontier workers who
are resident of the other country are denied such a deduction).
While there is indeed no precise case on point, from the
Court's decision in Avoir fiscal,6 it may be derived that the
Court interprets the EC Treaty's freedom rules as indeed re-
quiring equal treatment of non-resident and resident taxpayers
with regard to both the taxable items of income and the de-
ductibility of expenses. The Avoir fiscal decision dealt with the
denial by France of the imputation credit that it grants to its
resident (corporate and individual) shareholders, to a company
that was a resident of Italy and that operated in France
through a permanent establishment whose business capital
included the French shares concerned. The Court ruled that:
Since the rules at issue place [resident] companies and
[non-resident] companies on the same footing for the purpos-
es of taxing their profits, those rules cannot, without giving
rise to discrimination, treat them differently in regard to the
grant of an advantage related to taxation such as
shareholders' tax credits.'
6. Case 270/83, Commission of the EC v. French Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 285.
7. Id. at 305.
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It must be acknowledged that France, unlike most coun-
tries, does not subject resident companies to tax in respect of
foreign source income. Strictly speaking, there is, therefore, no
difference between the income in respect of which resident
companies and non-resident companies are liable to tax. In
effect, however, the denial of the imputation credit to non-
resident shareholders results in a taxation of non-resident
taxpayers with respect to a given item of income that is less
favorable than the taxation of resident taxpayers on the same
type of income. It, therefore, seems that the Avoir fiscal deci-
sion provides a strong indication of the Court's feeling vis-d-vis
cases in which items of income of gain of non-resident taxpay-
ers are subjected to less favorable taxation than such income
and gains that are in the hands of residents.
Where dividends, interest, and royalties are concerned
(and in some states also other items of income) that typically
are taxed to non-residents on a gross basis (and at a flat rate),
the Court may take a different approach. By not taxing such
items on a net basis as is done where resident taxpayers are
concerned, discrimination arises in cases where the amount of
tax that would be due under a net basis is lower than the
gross-basis tax.
IV. PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS
In its Schumacker and Wielockx decisions, the EC Court
ruled that a source state must grant personal deductions to
non-resident taxpayers if they derive their worldwide income
"entirely or almost exclusively" from sources in that country.'
The Court based its decision on the reasoning that such tax-
payers cannot effectuate their personal deductions in their
residence state in the absence of (adequate) income from that
country. These decisions are in line with the 1993 Recommen-
dation of the EC Commission that non-resident taxpayers, who
derive at least 75 percent of their worldwide income from the
source country, are entitled to taxation by that country on
equal footing with resident taxpayers.
By restricting its ruling to taxpayers who derive all, or
8. Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K6ln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, 1995
E.C.R. at 1-263; Case C-80/94, G.H.E.J. Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe
Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-2515.
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virtually all, their income from a country other than their
country of residence, it left unrelieved all cases where a tax-
payer derives all, or virtually all, of his worldwide income from
more than one non-residence state, as well as cases where the
fraction of a taxpayer's foreign income is lower, but still too
high to be. able to obtain full relief in his residence country.
Unlike the Court's (probable) treatment of items of gross in-
come and related expenses9 the Court's rulings on personal
deductions fall short of providing adequate relief.
V. TAX RATE
The first case decided by the EC Court of Justice, on possi-
ble discriminatory application of tax rates, was Biehl. ° The
case did not concern the taxation of a non-resident taxpayer
but of a person ("Mr. Biehl") who was a resident of Luxem-
bourg for only a part of the taxable year concerned. The issue
was whether, in determining which rate of the progressive tax
rate structure should be applied to the taxpayer's monthly
salary, Luxembourg was allowed to refer to the income that
the taxpayer would have earned in the entire taxable year (12
months), while the given individual earned his monthly salary
only during a period of 10 months. This issue has some simi-
larity to the question whether, with regard to the taxation of
non-resident individuals, a source country may determine the
applicable individual income tax rate on the basis of the world-
wide income of the non-resident taxpayer rather than on the
income this person derives from the source country only."
In its Biehl decision, the Court ruled that to determine the
appropriate tax rate, Luxembourg only may take into account
the income the taxpayer earned during the part of the year
that he lived and worked in Luxembourg. On the basis of this
ruling it may be concluded that also the country to which the
taxpayer moved from Luxembourg (i.e., Germany) would be
allowed, in determining the applicable tax rate, to take into
account only the income earned in that country. As a result,
Mr. Biehl would not only pay a lower effective tax on the in-
9. See supra Part III.
10. Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions of the Grand-
Duchy Luxembourg, 1990 E.C.R. L-1779.
11. This issue was addressed by the Court in the Asscher case, discussed
infra.
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come earned in his first residence country (Luxembourg)-in
comparison to a taxpayer that earns during the entire taxable
year the same amount of income as Mr. Biehl earns in the first
and second country combined-but Mr. Biehl also pays less tax
in his new residence country (i.e., Germany) than a full year
resident of that country would pay on the same monthly in-
come earned during the months that Mr. Biehl resides and
works in Germany. As a result of the Court's ruling, Mr. Bieh
is treated by each of the two countries more favorably than
either a Luxembourg or a German resident taxpayer who earns
exactly the same monthly salary in the given year as Mr. Biehl
does.
A few years later the Court took the same approach in the
Asscher case. 2 This case did not concern a person who was a
resident of an EU Member State during only part of the tax-
able year as in the Biehl decision, but a person who received a
part of his income from sources in one EU Member State (the
Netherlands) a resident of another EU Member State (Bel-
gium) where he also derived income. In the year under consid-
eration, the Netherlands applied a 25% rate to the first brack-
et of income instead of the 13% rate that was applicable to
resident taxpayers. One of the arguments forwarded by the
Netherlands was that non-resident and resident taxpayers are,
with regard to rate application, not in the same position be-
cause the tax rate to which resident taxpayers are subject in
respect of their Netherlands-source income is upwardly adjust-
ed by the amount of their foreign income with respect to which
they are entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation. It,
therefore, should be considered non-discriminatory if, in deter-
mining the tax rate at which non-resident taxpayers are sub-
ject to Dutch taxation, non-Dutch income is taken into account.
(It should be noted, however, that rather than effectively re-
quiring non-residents to report their foreign source income for
purposes of establishing the applicable tax rate, the Nether-
lands simply applied a somewhat higher first bracket rate than
it applied to resident taxpayers.)
The EC Court ruled that the Netherlands may not apply to
non-resident taxpayers a higher tax rate than it applies to
12. Case C-107/94, Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financiin, 1996 E.C.R. I-
3089.
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resident taxpayers in order to take into account that the non-
resident may have received items of income from other coun-
tries. It is not known, of course, whether the Court would have
decided differehtly if the source state (the Netherlands) would
have applied to non-resident taxpayers not a generally applica-
ble approximating rate but, on a case-by-case basis, a rate
based on the worldwide income of the nonresident taxpayers
(as, for example, Switzerland does). From the Court's approach
in the Biehl case, however, it does not seem likely that the-
judgment would have been different. The Asscher ruling itself
provides an indication for such a conclusion. The ground for
the Court's decision appears not to be the general applicability
of a higher rate (instead of an application on a case-by-case
basis), but the (incorrect) belief of the Court that, since Bel-
gium as a residence country provides an exemption with pro-
gression, there is no need for the Netherlands to take into
account in determining the applicable tax rate the income
derived by the taxpayer from sources in Belgium or third coun-
tries.
According to the Netherlands Government, the higher
rate of tax is intended to offset the fact that certain non-resi-
dents escape the progressive nature of the tax because their
tax obligations are confined to income received in the Nether-
lands.
It must be noted that, under Article 24(2)(1) of the [tax
treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium], modelled on
Article 23A(1) and (3) of the OECD Model Convention (ex-
emption with maintenance of progressivity), income received
in a State in which the taxpayer pursues an economic activ-
ity but does not reside is taxable exclusively in that State
and exempt in the State of residence. The State in which the
taxpayer resides may nevertheless take that income into ac-
count in calculating the amount of tax on the remaining
income in order, inter alia, to apply the rule of progressivity.
The fact that a taxpayer is a non-resident thus does not
enable him, in the circumstances under consideration, to
escape the application of the rule of progressivity.13
In other words, the Court believes (again, incorrectly) that
since Belgium as the residence country takes into account the
13. See id. paras. 46-48.
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Netherlands source income in determining the appropriate tax
rate on the Belgian part of the income, there is no need for the
Netherlands to do the same in respect of the Netherlands part
of the income. The Court thus demonstrates a complete lack of
understanding of the operation of "exemption with progression"
as applied by many exemption countries in determining the
amount of double taxation relief.
A simple example may illustrate the foregoing. Let us
assume that both EU Member States R(esidence) and S(ource)
apply in their individual income taxes the following rate struc-
ture: On the first income slice of 10 the tax rate is 0% (tax on
this slice amounts to 0). On the. second income slice of 10 the
tax rate is 10% (tax on this slice amounts to 1). On the third
income slice of 10 the tax rate is 20% (tax on this slice
amounts to 2). On the fourth income slice of 10 the tax rate is
30% (tax on this slice amounts to 3). On the fifth income slice
of 10 the tax rate is 40% (tax on this slice amounts to 4).
The tax due by a State R resident, who has income of 50
that is entirely derived from sources in State R, therefore
amounts to 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. (The same is true for a resi-
dent of State S who receives income amounting to 50 from
sources in State S). If the State R resident derives of his world-
wide income of 50, an amount of 20 from sources in State S,
and State R relieves double taxation through "proportional tax
exemption" (often, imprecisely referred to as "exemption with
progression") State R will compute the amount of the tax re-
duction as follows: 20/50 x 10 = 4, indeed resulting in tax to be
paid of 10 - 4 = 6.
It will be clear that if State S, which is assumed to apply
exactly the same tax rates as State R, will subject the income
that is sourced in State S (20) to a tax of 4 only if it would
take into account in determining the applicable tax rate not
only the 20 of income derived from sources within its territory,
but also-as Switzerland does-the 30 income from State R,
and computes the amount of tax by deducting from the tax
computed in respect of the worldwide income of 50 (10), that
part of the tax of 10 that refers to the income derived from
sources in State W (30/50 x 10 = 6), resulting in a tax to be
paid to State S of 10 - 6 = 4.
Instead of having State S apply such an "exemption with
progression," an equitable result also would be obtained if
State R would apply an "exemption at the bottom," i.e., reduc-
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ing its tax computed on the basis of the worldwide income by
that part of such tax that would have been imposed on income
that the taxpayer derives from the source country (i.e., 1). In
this approach State R would compute the tax to be paid as
follows: 10 - 1 = 9.
The problem, illustrated in the preceding paragraph, with
the divergence between the taxation by the source state and
the relief granted by the residence state, is not so much the
difference in the tax amounts as such (such difference will
always arise where states apply different tax rates and com-
pute taxable income differently), but the difference in the com-
putation of these amounts: The source state computes the tax
at the bottom of the progressive rate scale whereas the resi-
dence state provides an exemption at a (higher) average rate
reflecting the worldwide income. The same phenomenon may
occur when the residence state applies the foreign tax credit,
namely when the limit on the credit ("ordinary credit") is com-
puted through a proportional allocation of the domestic tax to
the foreign income and this limit applies in the given case,
while the source country applies its tax rate without taking
into account any income the taxpayer receives from sources
elsewhere.
VI. PROPOSAL
The various issues that have been highlighted in the pre-
ceding paragraphs can be solved if each of the EU Member
States, from which a non-resident individual derives income,
treats this individual pro rata parte with regard to the taxable
items of income and related deductible expenses, the personal
deductions, and the tax rate on the same footing with a resi-
dent taxpayer. At the same time, the residence state of this
individual should restrict his right to personal deductions to
that fraction thereof that is equal to the fraction: aggregate
amount of income items derived from sources in his residence
State divided by worldwide income.
Source States can effect such a pro rata parte approach
only if they have at their disposal the necessary information
with regard to the amount of income the non-resident taxpayer
derives from sources abroad, along with the data required for
computing his personal deductions. Because both types of in-
formation are not available in the source country, and need to
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be provided by the taxpayer, the source state may want to be
able to verify such data. The EC 1977 Directive on Mutual
Administrative Assistance provides the means to verify the
information produced by the taxpayer. It is clear, however,
that the administrative burden for the source state in making
such verification is relatively great. It, therefore, seems prefer-
able to restrict the application of the pro rata parte approach
to instances where the taxpayer so requests (i.e., makes such a
request to all (source) states from which he derives income)
and, in the absence of such a request, to permit the source
states: (a) to tax capital income (and perhaps employment
income as well) on a gross basis; (b) not to permit personal
deductions; and, (c) to apply tax rates, the lowest of which is
higher (e.g., 30%) than the lowest rate applicable to resident
taxpayers.
The pro rata parte approach by the source State implies
that this State first determines the taxable income of the perti-
nent non-resident taxpayer fully in accordance with the rules
that apply to residents of that State. The tax computed on the
basis of that income subsequently will be restricted to that
part thereof that is determined by the fraction: Net income
from sources in the source state divided by net worldwide in-
come. Both the numerator and the denomiinator of this fraction
are determined on the basis of the tax law of the source state.
Consequently, a taxpayer who is a resident of one EU Member
State and who receives, in addition to income from sources in
the residence state, income from two other EU Member States,
and who opts for taxation by the source states on a pro rata
parte basis, needs to compute his worldwide income under as
many tax systems as there are EU Member states from which
he derives income. The denominator of the fraction (the
amount of the worldwide income), therefore, will differ from
country to country. In this "slice of the pie" approach, the vari-
ous slices will not, as a result of the existing differences among
the tax systems of the individual states, jointly form a nice
round pie. Given the differences among the tax systems, how-
ever, this approach represents the highest possible degree of
equal treatment of a non-resident taxpayer with resident tax-
payers of each of the countries concerned, because in each
source state the non-resident is treated pro rata parte on equal
footing with resident taxpayers.
An important issue is presented by how much the tax rate
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that source states may impose on non-resident taxpayers, that
do not opt for taxation at a pro rata parte basis, may exceed
the tax rate applicable to resident taxpayers of that state.
Apart from the extra effort that the exercise by the taxpayer of
the option to be taxed proportionally as a resident taxpayer
means for him, his choice whether or not to exercise this option
will be guided by any resulting tax savings that the option
produces over gross basis taxation by the source state. Such
saving may occur on the one hand as a result of the difference
between the gross and the net amount of the income, and on
the other hand because of the difference between the regular
tax rate and the flat rate that is applied to non-opting non-
residents. 4
VII. CONCLUSION
In the proposal described in the preceding section, various
questions that will arise upon closer examination of the ap-
proach suggested, have not been addressed. The aim of pre-
senting the proposal in its current rudimentary form is to
suggest better approaches to equitable treatment of non-resi-
dent taxpayers than are currently available under the domestic
tax law of any country. The increasing mobility of individuals
and the rising awareness of the unfairness of existing inatory
tax practices by the states in dealing with cross-border income,
makes a search for novel approaches in the taxation of such
income viable.
14. Le., the 30% rate that was suggested above.
[Vol. XKVI:41492
